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viii*—the distribution of numbers
and the comprehensiveness of
reasons1
by Ve´ronique Munoz-Darde´
abstract In this paper, I concentrate on two themes: to what extent
numbers bear on an agent’s duties, and how numbers should relate to
social policy. In the ﬁrst half of the paper I consider the abstract case of a
choice between saving two people and saving one, and my focus is on the
contrast between a duty to act and a reason which merely makes an action
intelligible. In the second half, I turn to the issue of social policy and inves-
tigate how if at all numbers can have a bearing there, if there is no obvious
duty on individuals to save the greater number. My proposal is that it is
not the bare numbers themselves (or even the ratio of claimants on either
side of the dilemma) which explain our intuitions in such cases, but rather
considerations of the extent to which each of us can make a reasonable
claim on others. In short, I argue: numbers don’t count, people do.
M any people hold that, in matters of distributive justice, thenumber of people aﬀected through a policy is one of the
main considerations for or against it. Likewise, now with an eye
to an agent’s duties to others, many think that individuals should
be guided by the number of people aﬀected by their actions.
Those who hold that the number of people involved generates
reasons or duties for us also recognize that other concerns bear
on us too: the urgency or stringency of claims, questions of
responsibility, fairness, autonomy, et cetera . . .However, when
other moral considerations are equal, they aﬃrm the following:
the number of people aﬀected by each of the courses of actions
available to us is a fundamental, and indeed in the circumstances
conclusive, consideration in deciding what to do. My aim, in this
paper, is to question this proposition.
*Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, held in Senate House, University of London,
on Monday, 7 February, 2005 at 4.15 p.m.
1. For extensive discussion of arguments in this paper I am grateful to Niko
Kolodny, Mike Martin, Mike Otsuka, Joseph Raz, Tim Scanlon, and David Wiggins.
I have also beneﬁted from conversations with Ian Carter, Ronald Dworkin, Brian
Feltham, Alexander Friedman, Sebastian Gardner, Brad Hooker, Mark Kalderon,
Frances Kamm, Hallvard Lillehammer, Barry Loewer, David Owens, Paul Snowdon,
Zolta´n Gendler Szabo´, Georgia Testa, Andrew Williams, as well as comments from
audiences at the UCL Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy, the Institut
d’Etudes Politiques (Paris), Harvard, Sheﬃeld, and the Collegium Budapest.
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My main focus will be the role that numbers play in our
thinking about duties and wrongness, and the type of reasons
they provide for individual agents, on the one hand, and the
ways they bear on social policy, on the other. The case for
the weight of numbers in the realm of social policy may,
perhaps, seem beyond doubt: no one could easily deny that we
need some formula to provide guidance in diﬃcult decisions
involving conﬂicting claims of need and scarce resources. In
such circumstances, it seems inevitable that considerations of
numbers involved become salient. Many are then led to assume
that numbers are one of the decisive considerations in laying out
principles of distributive justice. As widespread as this assump-
tion is, and as plausible as the intuitive grounds often oﬀered for
it seem to be, still there is a reason to think that our intuitions
about various cases are not stable, but can be induced now to
favour one kind of policy or action, now to favour another. For
example, consider a case described by Thomas Scanlon:
Suppose that Jones has suﬀered an accident in the transmitter
room of a television station. Electrical equipment has fallen
on his arm, and we cannot rescue him without turning oﬀ
the transmitter for ﬁfteen minutes. A World Cup match is in
progress, watched by many people, and it will not be over for
an hour. Jones’s injury will not get any worse if we wait, but
his hand has been mashed and he is receiving extremely painful
electrical shocks. (Scanlon, 1998: 235)
Most of us feel that even if a hundred million people were
watching this game, we ought to interrupt the transmission to
save Jones from his hour of severe pain. It is tempting to suppose
that our intuitions in this case oﬀer support to a general principle,
namely that the number of people involved should not lead us
to aggregate small beneﬁts and let them simply outweigh severe
burdens. But now consider a second example.
If no eﬀective cure is found, one in a hundred million people will
die of a particular disease when they reach their mid-teens. Were
we to redirect all the resources presently devoted to education,
arts and humanities, into research for a cure, a cure would be
found, and the one in a hundred million teenager aﬀected by it
in each community would survive.
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If any individual has a claim of need, surely such a teenager
does. Yet many of us lack the intuition that we should so redirect
resources to saving the person aﬀected by the rare disease. At the
very least, we hesitate before closing all the universities and all
the schools in order to devote the money to research for saving
this life.
There are important diﬀerences between the two cases. To be
sure, depriving the young of school education is not on a par with
missing out on a football game, even a thrilling one. However,
given the similarities between these two cases in terms of
distribution of burdens and beneﬁts, and of the ratio of numbers
on each side, the question remains: why do our intuitions go so
ﬁrmly in opposite directions in the two examples? Few would be
inclined to consider that the need of the teenager is outweighed.
Yet we doubt that all these funds must be redirected for research
to cure his illness. The question is how to explain this attitude.
Reﬂecting on cases of this sort, we might conjecture that a
picture of our duties to others that starts from the assumption
that numbers matter, and then operates with comparisons of
aggregate costs and beneﬁts, will not be able to comport with
all of our intuitions about what is just. But how else are we to
address dilemmas related to meeting urgent needs with limited
resources? The purpose of this paper is to make some progress in
the understanding of such dilemmas, and to sketch what might
be a more intuitive theoretical framework for approaching them.
My discussion will concentrate on two aspects: how best to
explain our intuitions that numbers matter, and the grounds of
duties and principles. In the ﬁrst half of the paper I consider the
abstract case of a choice between saving two people and saving
one, and my focus will be on the contrast between a duty to
act and some reason which makes an action intelligible. Having
come to question the existence of any duty related directly to
numbers in the individual agent’s case, we turn to the social
case and investigate how if at all numbers can have a bearing
there, if there is no obvious duty on individuals to save the
greater number. In particular I will explore the threshold to
reasonable demands we can make on others, and whether we
should suppose that, in the social sphere, principles provide
comprehensive reasons which determine the right way of acting.
My proposal will be that it is not the bare numbers themselves (or
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even the ratio of claimants on either side of the dilemma) which
explain our intuitions, but rather considerations of the extent to
which each of us can make a reasonable claim on others.
II
Let us start with a simple case, even if described in the abstract.
We have a choice between saving two people and saving one,
and we cannot save all three. If everything else is equal, and
given that numbers are the only salient feature, most people feel
compelled to say that we must save the two. (In the rest of this
discussion I will refer to this idea as the principle of saving the
greater number, SGN for short.)
In her discussion of the doctrine of double eﬀect, Philippa
Foot states this conviction in the form of a manifest duty: ‘We
feel bound to let one man die rather than many if that is our
only choice’ (Foot, 1967: 9). (Foot is discussing a choice between
giving a drug to a patient who needs it to save his life, or giving
the same drug to ﬁve patients each of whom could be saved by
one ﬁfth of it.) In a brief and illuminating discussion of this point,
Elizabeth Anscombe observes: ‘Mrs Foot regards it as obvious
that one must save the greater number’; nonetheless Anscombe
claims to feel ‘a curious disagreement about this’ (Anscombe,
1967: 16).
My contention, in this paper, is that there are reasons to
share Anscombe’s ‘curious disagreement’. That is: we may ask
why there is such an obvious duty to save the greater number.
To voice such a doubt is not to say that numbers should not
count; for they may be a perfectly intelligible reason to act one
way rather than another. Rather our initial question is whether
numbers in the case under discussion do provide a conclusive
reason from which we can derive a duty.2
Throughout this paper I will rely on this distinction between
conclusive and merely intelligible reasons, so let me say one more
word to clarify it. The idea of a conclusive reason, as I use it, is
2. In an article published a decade after Anscombe’s discussion note, John Taurek
too contests that numbers should count in situations such as the example given by
Foot. I share some of Taurek’s views, but for reasons which will become apparent,
I disagree with one of his conclusions. I disagree, that is, that the right thing to say
about this case is that numbers ‘should not count’.
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this. A conclusive reason in a given situation, for -ing, is one
which, when introduced into our deliberation, leads directly to
the conclusion to  rather than not.3 Our question is whether in
a choice of action the fact that there is a greater number on one
side over another provides a conclusive reason for that course
when all else is equal.
Before we proceed, let us state the problem under consider-
ation a little more precisely. I assume that we have no prior
commitment to consequentialism—to the view that the rightness
or wrongness of actions is determined by properties of states of
aﬀairs brought about by acting. More exactly, I shall not start
with the assumption that there is any impersonal value, realized
in either option related to the numbers of people involved.4
Rather, the route I shall pursue is to ask whether we can ﬁnd
reasons for the agent to act in one way rather than the other
which can be oﬀered as a justiﬁcation to all individuals involved.
The advantage of Anscombe’s perspective for that purpose is
precisely that on her reasoning the justiﬁability of SGN depends
on individuals’ reasons to accept it or to object to it. Someone
may object that it does not make sense to impose such a
constraint here, since SGN cannot be a duty to the individuals
aﬀected, and in particular to the individual(s) who will not be
saved. Someone who made this objection would seem to be
assuming that we have duties towards people only as the objects
of our actions. To respond, a distinction is needed. I may have
a duty to save, but not a duty to save you. A duty to save can
be justiﬁed to each of the individuals involved even if not every
single one of these individuals is going to be saved. The fact that
I justify a principle to you does not by itself commit me to doing
something for you. So our precise question is whether such a
justiﬁcation of a duty to SGN can be oﬀered to all individuals
involved. That is, an explanation of why the greater number must
be saved which does not presuppose the principle of SGN, but
rather seeks to establish it.
3. Note that a reason’s being conclusive in one situation does not entail its being
conclusive in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent cases. For more on this, see Section IV.
4. By impersonal value I mean one the worth of which obtains independently of its
being a good for an agent or agents. Such a value would make one situation better
than another without thereby having to be good for an agent or agents related to
that situation.
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III
Let us now turn to Anscombe’s line of reasoning. Anscombe
has two aims. The ﬁrst (and probably most important) is to
illustrate a scepticism towards a law-like conception of the moral
‘ought’—previously elaborated in her Modern Moral Philosophy
(1958). I shall return very brieﬂy to this theoretical question in
Section VI. For now I intend to concentrate on her second,
more circumscribed, discussion, namely: who is wronged when
we choose to save one, in a situation in which we can either save
one person or several, but not all?
Her reasoning about the Foot case of the doctor faced with a
choice between giving a life-saving drug to one or to ﬁve is this:
Suppose I am the doctor, and I don’t use the drug at all. Whom
do I wrong? None of them can say: ‘You owed it to me.’ For
there might be nine, and if one can say that, all can; but if I used
it, I let one at least go without and he can’t say I owed it to
him. Yet all can reproach me if I gave it to none. It was there,
ready to supply human need, and human need was not supplied.
So any one of them can say: you ought to have used it to help
us who needed it; and so all are wronged. But if it was used for
someone, as much as he needed it to keep him alive, no one has
any ground for accusing me of having wronged himself.—Why,
just because he was one of ﬁve who could have been saved, is
he wronged in not being saved, if someone is supplied with it
who needed it? What is his claim, except the claim that what was
needed go to him rather than be wasted? But it was not wasted.
So he was not wronged. So who was wronged? And if no one
was wronged, what injury did I do? (Anscombe, 1967: 16–17)
I shall come back to this last question (Is there a wrong
committed if no one is wronged?) in Section VI. But ﬁrst let
us focus on the question of which person is wronged, if we fail
to save the greater number. Note that the question introduces
a perspective which helps clarify what I said in passing in the
previous section, namely that justifying to you a duty to save
does not mean that there is a duty of saving you. For there is at
least one person who is not going to be saved (the one who is on
her own), and no one seems to want to argue that the right thing
to do is to save no one and to let all die. So on every account of
what is the justiﬁable thing to do there will still be at least one
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person for whom nothing is done, and that person can still not
oppose the principle by saying that she has been wronged. This
may need spelling out a little further.
Thomas Scanlon, in particular, has set out to meet the
challenge of justifying to the person isolated (the person who is
not going to be saved if SGN is observed) the fact that the drug
should go to the others. Suppose that we know independently
that SGN is the right principle to adopt. Then in one sense,
the sense in which all are wronged if the right principle is not
observed, this person is wronged if the drug goes to her. And
indeed I may feel aggrieved if beneﬁts come to me in the wrong
way, depriving others of what they are owed. But saying that the
person who is isolated should feel ‘wronged’ if her life is saved
(in violation of SGN) looks strange; and indeed Scanlon does
not phrase it this way at all. What he says is that it would be
unreasonable for the isolated person to reject SGN. But now
another doubt arises. If Anscombe is right, if strictly speaking
no one is wronged whether I choose to save the one or the many,
why would it be unreasonable to reject SGN?
Scanlon’s answer is that it is each ‘additional’ person who is
wronged. In an argument which draws on Kamm’s views,5 Scan-
lon asks us to consider a series of cases: zero to one, one to one,
one to two, zero to two. The reasoning against the permissibility
of saving either a larger or a smaller group of people is this:
In such a case, either member of the larger group might complain
that this principle did not take account of the value of saving his
life, since it permits the agent to decide what to do in the very
same way that it would have permitted had he not been present at
all, and there was only one person in each group. The fate of the
single person is obviously being given positive weight, he might
argue, since if that person were not threatened then the agent
would have been required to save the two. And the fact that
there is one other person who can be saved if and only if the ﬁrst
person is not saved is being given positive weight to balance the
value of saving the one. The presence of the additional person,
5. See (Kamm, 1993): Chapters 5 and 6; Scanlon refers in particular to pages 116–
117. Kamm brieﬂy considers Anscombe’s challenge (Kamm, 1993: 119), but argues
that a process of balancing of personal interests on each side would decide in favour
of SGN. (She thinks that if the presence of an additional person makes no diﬀerence,
that person is not given due recognition of her equal signiﬁcance.)
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however, makes no diﬀerence to what the person is required to
do or how she is required to go about deciding what to do. This
is unacceptable, the person might argue, since his life should be
given the same moral signiﬁcance as anyone else’s in this situation
(which is, by stipulation, a situation in which no one has a special
moral claim). (Scanlon, 1998: 232)
If we don’t get distracted by the language of ‘weights’,
Scanlon’s point is simple and appealing, namely that we need a
diﬀerent procedure for one-one cases and one-two cases. (Just as
we have a diﬀerent procedure for zero-one and one-one cases.)6
This is the ‘additional’ person’s case, and Scanlon’s case for
SGN: the additional person would be wronged if we adopt the
same procedure for a one–one case and a one–two case. But now
we have just pushed the question one step back, without getting
rid of it. For in order to agree that we need to treat one–one
and one–two cases diﬀerently, we need already to believe that
numbers matter.
Scanlon’s thought here is attractive in that we seem to have
a sequence of diﬀerent cases in which we need at each stage a
diﬀerent procedure. We can represent this in the form of a table:
How Many to be Saved?
i 0 0 Save no one
ii 1 0 Save the one
iii 1 1 Save either
iv 2 1 Save the two
However, the appeal of this way of presenting things is
misleading. For what is the salient diﬀerence at each stage? Faced
with this table, Anscombe would answer that if we attend to the
duty to save, the need for modifying the procedure between i)
and ii) and ii) and iii) is apparent, but not so between iii) and
6. This insistence on an adequate procedure is closely linked to Scanlon’s reliance
on reasonableness: the test of a principle is not whether it makes some people better
oﬀ than they would be in its absence, but whether it is the best procedure for
deciding conﬂicting claims, a procedure that not even these who stand to lose by
it can reasonably reject.
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iv). She would contend, therefore, that the table should only have
three rows thus:
Is there human need?
i No No Save no one
ii Yes No Save the one
iii Yes Yes Save either
So Anscombe can agree with Scanlon that diﬀerent cases
need diﬀerent procedures. But they disagree on what constitutes
the diﬀerence between cases; they disagree, that is, whether the
salient feature of each case is the number of people in need, rather
than the mere human need to be helped.7
Is this too quick? Someone attracted by Scanlon’s justiﬁcation
for SGN might object that, contrary to what I just claimed,
numbers are not presupposed in his reasoning. The justiﬁcation
he oﬀers for SGN is addressed to individuals. Surely we need
to justify our action to the additional person; her life must
be given some consideration, and this supports saving the two
without presupposing any aggregative judgment. At no point, in
other words, does the justiﬁcation rely on saying to the person
isolated, who is not going to be saved: ‘We must save the two
because they are two and you are just one.’ A ﬁrst worry is
that the tie-breaking argument might then not generalize beyond
the case of just one versus two.8 Be this as it may, Anscombe
could agree that the additional person’s life must be taken into
account, and add that, in her reasoning, the person’s life does
count. The additional person’s life is a claim that the rescuer
7. Maybe some will disagree. They will argue that the fact that Anscombe has one
less row shows precisely that she is abstracting from an important feature of the case
(the fact that there are diﬀerent number of people on each side). But Scanlon is also
abstracting from certain features of the cases under consideration. For example, he
is not changing the procedure whether the person to be saved is on the right or the
left hand side. (He treats in the same way 1–0 cases and 0–1 cases, 2–1 cases and 1–2
cases and so forth.) Why? Of course, because the spatial distribution of need does
not matter. But just in the same way, unless you have already established the fact
that the number of people in need matters, you cannot assume a relevant diﬀerence
between rows iii and iv.
8. Scanlon raised just this concern in personal correspondence. The thought is that
in cases of n versus n + 1, where n is greater than 1, we cannot think of a tie that
the additional person is breaking without making a genuine aggregative judgment.
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must take into consideration; it is human need which works in
him as a reason. Its failing to count can only be illustrated by an
aggregative thought: namely that there is one on one side and
two on the other, and that this should generate a diﬀerent policy.
Scanlon seems to be presupposing that SGN is a correct
principle, since the distinctions he draws implicitly assume
that numbers are signiﬁcant to the choice made, rather than
establishing that numbers must count for us even when we start
out just from the perspective of all parties involved. Hence, it is
not clear how we could establish SGN once we press Anscombe’s
question.
IV
What are the consequences of adopting Anscombe’s perspective?
To begin with, her way of envisaging this problem avoids the
distraction caused by the language of weights in the assessment
of reasons (especially when we are addressing the relevance of
numbers as a reason to adopt a course of action over other
possible courses of action). Otherwise one might give in to the
temptation to think that we have as many reasons to save as there
are people on each side and that the reasons can be ‘added’. So
in the case of two people against one, other things being equal,
the reasons to save the two people would seem to ‘outweigh’
the reason to save the one. This way of thinking about reasons
should be resisted, even if it seems tempting to many people in the
particular case under discussion.9 Two reasons may sometimes
combine, but reasons do not become conclusive by juxtaposition;
and one conclusive reason in favour of a course of action is
suﬃcient.10 In this case Anscombe suggests that we have one
9. For a recent example see (Parﬁt, 2003: 378). Parﬁt asks us to consider a case in
which we, equipped with a lifeboat, could save either White, stranded on one rock,
or ﬁve other people, stranded on another. He then writes: ‘The ﬁve must be allowed
to argue that . . . their ﬁve reasons together outweigh White’s.’ (Emphasis added.
Parﬁt uses this argument precisely against what he calls ‘Scanlon’s Individualist
Restriction’.)
10. Scanlon would seem to concur, for he follows Kagan in warning against the
‘additive fallacy’ and the ‘slippery metaphor of “weight”’ in the domain of reasons’
(Scanlon, 1998: 397, n. 35). Unfortunately, Scanlon takes it back immediately,
and succumbs precisely to this metaphor. For he claims that, in the case under
consideration, ‘the signiﬁcance of the additional life does take this form’ (of an
additional ‘weight’ which decides the case by tipping the balance of reasons).
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and the same conclusive reason on each side, namely the human
need to be saved. (The reason is ‘conclusive’ because it establishes
that it would be wrong to save no one, that each of the people
in need would be wronged if help were entirely withheld.)
The second, and related, aspect brought out by Anscombe’s
discussion is that even in the pure abstract case in which there
is no relevant factor other than each person’s need to be saved,
we do not have a duty to save the greater number. Even, that
is, if everything else is equal, we have a choice between saving
two people and saving one, and that is our only choice, there is
nothing wrong about taking either course of action, at least from
the perspective of what we owe to each of the people involved.
This contradicts an apparently appealing way of thinking of
the case at hand: Concern for particular individuals generates
constraints on the application of aggregative standards (and on
the related impulse to minimize harm). These side constraints
should be ﬁrmly imposed when, and in as far as, aggregative
reasoning yields unjust or unfair results; e.g., ignoring the
separateness of individual losses in a given distribution, because
of the focus on combined beneﬁts. But when such threats to the
concerns of individuals are not in play, for example as in cases
in which losses or injuries are evenly balanced and the only
diﬀerence between taking one course of action and another is
the number of people saved, then aggregative standards should
be applied without restriction. On this line of thought, the only
principle that can govern your action in our example is SGN. If
everything else is equal, that is, you have a duty to save the
greater number.
There is something right in the intuition here, as we shall
return to below: in cases of social policy in which numbers do
diﬀer markedly there are often grounds which compel us to act
to save what is, in fact, the greater number (if not because they
are so much more numerous). For all its popularity, however,
I don’t think that we should accept the reasoning here, or the
claim that, in the pure abstract case, numbers ‘tip the balance’.
First, this kind of reasoning seems to assume that there is some
form of impersonal value in play here which recommends saving
the greater number. And one might question whether there is
any such impersonal value as related to quantity. One might
criticize consequentialist reasoning, that is, at the point at which
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it introduces values to guide our actions, rather than waiting to
rein in what would otherwise lead to unintuitive consequences if
left unconstrained.
Second, and here more pressingly, one may wonder whether
just any value will ground a duty of action. Must the balance be
tipped? That is, even if we grant that there is some impersonal
value which recommends the saving of the greater number over
the smaller, does this generate a duty?11 Surely all that would
have been established is that it is permissible to save the greater
number, not that it is imperative to do so. For, unless the mere
fact that there is a reason to act on one side which is not echoed
on the other requires us on pain of wrongdoing to choose that
course of action, no duty will have been established.
Let me take these two thoughts together a little more slowly.
There are delicate issues here to do with the relation between
reasons, wrongness and duty. Suppose some impersonal value
is present which favours saving the greater number over the
smaller, does this give us a conclusive reason? We might just
say that such a value gives us what Anscombe calls ‘a perfectly
intelligible reason’ (Anscombe, 1967: 17) to act on one side
which is not echoed on the other. The reason is ‘intelligible’
in that it is not a ‘bad’ reason. If your reason for saving the
two rather than the one is that they are rich, the one on her
own poor, and that the need of poor people doesn’t work in
you as a consideration, this would constitute a ‘bad reason’
(that is: no reason at all).12 But if you say that you saved
the two because they were two rather than one, because you
want to maximize the value of saving, then people unmoved by
aggregative considerations could respond: ‘In the same situation
I would not have taken this course of action for that reason,
but I understand why you did it.’ And this is also all that
11. Note that I am merely granting the possibility that there is an impersonal value
so related to quantity for the sake of argument.
12. A bad reason is not merely irrelevant. If one saved one party rather than the other
for bad reasons, what one would do would be wrong. Contrast what Kamm would
call ‘irrelevant utilities’ (Kamm, 1993: 101). Unlike Kamm’s irrelevant utilities, which
may be a good reason to act in other circumstances, a bad reason is an illegitimate
consideration. (The idea of irrelevant utilities is illustrated by a case in which you
have a choice between saving A’s life and saving B’s. Alongside B is C who has a
sore throat. The drug that can save B’s life can also cure C’s sore throat. Kamm
thinks that the sore throat of the third person should not tip the balance.)
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the person aﬀected by the consideration that there are more
people on one side can say if you are moved by another, equally
intelligible, perfectly good, reason to take the opposite course
of action. She cannot, that is, blame you for wrong-doing. So
we can now return to the possibility left open by Anscombe
of a wrong committed without anyone being wronged. Even
given the existence of an impersonal value related to quantity,
a wrong could only be committed if this value grounds a duty.
And we have seen no reason to suppose any such impersonal
value grounds such a duty.
But does it really make sense to suppose that someone moved
by the numbers involved is acting merely on a reason which
makes intelligible their course of action, rather than acting on
something which requires them to move in some way? The
questions of there being a conclusive reason and of there being
a moral reason, or a duty, seem to be closely aligned. First, one
might be tempted to suppose that, given that we have highlighted
a reason to favour the one course of action, and that everything
else is equal, then the agent will anyway be required to act in that
way. That is, if one thinks that an agent is always required to
do whatever he or she has most reason to do, then the existence
of a reason on the one side with no compensating reason on
the other would always require saving the greater number. To
endorse this temptation is to accept a ‘maximizing’ conception of
reason: that we are rationally required to do what we have most
reason to do. Such a conception has no room for a distinction
between a merely intelligible reason for an action, one on which
one may act but need not, and a conclusive reason. Such a stance
is surely controversial. After all, it is not immediately obvious
that someone who feels the attraction of eating a peach, but in
the end fails to do so, though no other consideration intervenes
in their thoughts, thereby exhibits practical irrationality.
Suppose, then, that we allow that there can be a reason which
could move an agent to act in a certain direction, but does
not require that they so act. Making salient that the numbers
involved is indeed a value for us (if it is) would establish at least
this. Of course the defenders of SGN require more: that in the
circumstances there is a duty on the agent, that he or she would
otherwise have acted wrongly; and moreover that from this fact
we can identify a principle that we can also see to be operative
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in other circumstances. How should we bridge the gap between
these? Well, yet another temptation is simply to say that surely
if the numbers involved give us a reason, then they give us a
moral reason to act. And how could a moral reason be other
than conclusive?
Given our current stage of enquiry, this temptation must be
resisted. What could it be to say that the reason in question is
moral, other than to say that in the circumstances it gives us
a duty? And of course, that there would be a duty to save the
greater number, and that there are no countervailing consider-
ations, would seem to oﬀer conclusive grounds for action. But
to reason in this way is simply to assume that there is a duty,
rather than to argue for one, or explain why one should arise.
Once we press Anscombe’s question, we can see that, in the
purely abstract case where all that diﬀers is the numbers of agents
involved, however slightly, it is just not obvious that one must
save the greater number. There seems to be no reason to oﬀer
independent of the diﬀerence in number. Even if we can see the
diﬀerence as indicating an intelligible reason for acting one way
rather than the other, nothing shows that it must be conclusive
in action.
I have been writing as if the existence of a duty requires just
that it would be wrong for an agent to have acted otherwise
in those particular circumstances. But typically talk of a principle
of action is taken to imply consequences for actions in rather
diﬀerent circumstances. And that seems to be part of the ratio-
nale for defending SGN (a principle) by appeal to an abstract
situation which could never actually be realized. Yet without a
demonstration of there being a duty in the narrow sense that I
have used above, in these peculiar circumstances, as yet we have
no reason to suppose that there is any general moral principle
connected to numbers.13 (I’ll return to the question of duties and
principles in Section VI.)
13. Parﬁt argues that Taurek’s argument against SGN ignores the existence of agent-
centred restrictions on the obligations on us (Parﬁt, 1978). While that may be a fair
observation to make against Taurek’s strategy of testing the existence of an obligation
against one’s claims of interest in a friend, it does not touch the worries expressed
here, which focus rather on how the existence of either duty or principle could be
demonstrated in the ﬁrst place. (Parﬁt himself might well be unmoved by such a
complaint since he ﬁnds aggregative considerations so compelling in the ﬁrst place.)
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V
I have argued so far that all that we can say, even in the most
abstract case in which all that distinguishes the options for action
is the numbers to be saved, is that it is permissible and not
required that one save the greater number. This result might
look disappointing and lacking in direction. In particular, some
people may feel dissatisﬁed because they want to know what we
ought to do in that case. They are unhappy with the claim that it
is permissible to save either side, that the only duty we have is not
to withhold help. So they would urge us to choose between two
alternative ways of thinking about this problem. I just mentioned
(and rejected) one of them, namely that we aﬃrm SGN, but only
if everything else is equal. (Then numbers ‘tip the balance’.) The
other alternative is to say that it is a bad reason to save the two
because you want to save more rather than less.14 Let me add a
very brief comment on how the reasons for rejecting the ﬁrst of
these alternatives also lead us to reject the idea that it would be
wrong to let numbers count.
As we have seen, what is problematic is why there should be a
duty for an agent to save the greater number. That leaves entirely
open whether numbers generate a reason on which an agent may
act. That is to say: we don’t want to narrow the discussion down
to the stark alternatives of duties or bad reasons, without further
argument.
There is no reason to say that someone who is moved to save
the two rather than the one because he wanted to save more
rather than less was thereby moved by a bad reason. Likewise
we should be suspicious of the demand that you should devise
a procedure, perhaps ﬂipping a coin, in order to decide whom
to save.15 This would be to endorse a principle according to
which you have a duty to save whoever wins in the coin-ﬂipping
procedure. In the pure case, the case in which the only salient
feature which diﬀerentiates two incompatible courses of action
is the number of people on each side, we have indeed run out
14. Taurek seems committed to this position (at least where the choice is between
saving ﬁve people and saving a friend): ‘The numbers, in themselves, simply do not
count for me. I think that they should not count for any of us’ (Taurek, 1977: 310,
emphasis added).
15. This is the procedure suggested by Taurek (Taurek, 1977: 303ﬀ ).
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of reasons to aﬃrm that it would be wrong to save the greater
number.
That is: in the pure abstract case, our conclusions are merely
that there is a duty to save one party or the other, that it is
permissible not to save one party in saving the other, and that
there may be further reasons an agent has that make intelligible
his or her choice in saving one of the parties.16
VI
Anscombe concludes her discussion of these issues with an
expression of scepticism about systematic theories of reasons. She
writes, ‘When I do action A for reasons R, it is not necessary or
even usual for me to have any special reason for doing-action-A-
rather-than-action-B, which may also be possible’ (1967: 17). So
her whole discussion may appear as an instructive illustration
of a more general distrust of the ambition to come up with a
systematic set of rules and principles to settle all moral dilemmas.
My aim, in this paper, is far more modest, but let me say two
words on this aspect. Anscombe’s scepticism regarding moral
obligation, her claim that we ought to jettison the moral sense
of ‘ought’ may be overstated. But there is something sound
in her suspicion of rigoristic convictions stated in the form of
rules on which every judgement of right and wrong is then
supposed to rely. This is indeed a very strange way of thinking of
moral principles. A much more plausible way of understanding
principles, as Thomas Scanlon urges, is as the conclusion about
the status of various reasons, a form of shorthand for a complex
structure of reasons.17 What all principles will share, then, is
16. Note that my emphasis has been throughout on wrongness and duties. In strict
ignorance of whether one will be in the smaller or the bigger group, so that one is
only moved to maximize one’s chances of survival, one’s probability of ever being
saved is maximized by a principle of always saving the greater number. But there is
17. ‘In making judgements of right and wrong we are drawing on this complex
understanding, rather than applying a statable rule, and this understanding enables
(Scanlon, 1998: 201). For a similar perspective on principles see (Kolakowski, 1999:
31): ‘But if an absolute injunction against lying is both ineﬀective and potentially
in conﬂict with other, more important moral imperatives, how are we to go about
ﬁnding a general principles which will take account of those times when lying is
permissible? The answer . . . is that there is no such principle: no general rule can take
account of every conceivable moral circumstance and provide an infallible solution.’
us to arrive at conclusions about hard and diﬃcult cases, which no rule would cover’
no obvious way in which this observation connects with Anscombe’s question.
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that they contain in crisp form what is eﬀectively a more
complex rationale for imposing constraints on certain forms of
action.
If we understand principles in this way, there may be an
inﬁnite number of them (Scanlon, 1998: 201). But they can all be
traced back to the wrong that would be committed in the absence
of the principle (to the reasons for imposing certain constraints).
Principles thus understood are not, then, a way of organising all
the reasons we have.
In earlier sections I have claimed that if we have a choice
between saving two people and saving one (and we cannot save
all three), then, other things being equal, it is permissible to
save either side. We have seen reasons to express doubts about
the presence of a principle here. Were there such a principle
in the most abstract case, it should be clear to us that there
was a duty to save the greater number. But short of simply
aﬃrming the existence of such a duty, the defender of SGN
seems at the very best only to highlight for us a consideration
which makes intelligible why one chooses the larger party over
the smaller; and we have seen no ground for why this should
be required of us. This strongly suggests that either course of
action is permissible. Let me now make more precise the idea of
permissibility in the light of the conception of principles I just
invoked.
In saying that it is permissible to take either course of action
I am saying that, in this case, neither action is ruled out by
any conclusive reason which dictates what we have a duty to do
or refrain from doing. This is not to say that there is a single
principle which determines for either course of action whether
it is permissible or not to act in that way. An agent may ﬁnd
a reason for preferring one course of action over the other,
a reason which makes intelligible her choice without thereby
giving us a conclusive reason for so acting. Someone who feels
moved to save the two in the most abstract case is moved by
just such a non-conclusive reason. We should not think that the
realm of duties and obligations occupies the entire domain of
reasons for action. Perhaps most would readily grant this. What
I have argued here is that once one grants this, one should also
recognize there is a signiﬁcant gap between identifying something
which can act as a reason for an action, and identifying any
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corresponding duty or obligation. And this is the terrain in
common between Anscombe’s scepticism and my more cautious
response to the case in hand.18
VII
A doubt now arises. How does what I have said about the
dilemma facing an individual relate to dilemmas facing us in
social policy, where the numbers involved are much greater? How
if at all can numbers have a bearing in the social case, if there
is no duty on individuals to save the greater number? Many will
hold that when we shift the perspective from the choice which
faces a single agent to (arguably) more pressing and constant
choices in terms of public policy the case for SGN is obvious.
For these choices involve limited resources, for the application
of which numbers seem an obvious relevant factor.
Let us try to make this thought more precise. I have been
concerned all along with an agent faced with the choice between
saving two people and saving one. The central claim that it is
permissible to save either side meets with resistance from people
who understand the choice of the agent as a choice between
doing some good (saving one) and doing more good (saving
two). In previous sections I voiced doubts regarding this broadly
consequentialist way of understanding the case at hand. But
many will think that this is too quick.
It may for instance be argued that the pure case we have
discussed obscures quite how strong the intuition that numbers
count is. For consider. If numbers do not count, then the
example of an agent faced with a choice between saving two
people and saving one can be modiﬁed; the decision can now
be whether to save one or to save a billion people. The claim
that it is permissible for such an agent to save either side in the
modiﬁed example does look seriously fanatical. Surely, this line
of argument continues, this shows that numbers do count, and
the burden of proof is on whoever denies this.
18. I shall return to the question of the comprehensiveness of reasons in Section VII.
To anticipate, I suggest that in the social sphere too, principles provide a framework
within which there can be distinct intelligible reasons, rather than comprehensive
reasons which determine the rightness or wrongness of all ways of acting.
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That we can seriously doubt the permissibility of saving either
side in the modiﬁed example sounds right; however, it is not clear
what this line of argument succeeds in establishing. The person
proposing this argument is inﬂating the number of people on one
side, in order to insist that numbers do matter. This, however,
just raises the puzzle for us of why you have so to inﬂate numbers
to make the case obvious. For remember: the initial case was
so framed that the only salient diﬀerence between the options
was the number of people involved on each side. We might
then wonder whether an alternative explanation is available
of why the case introducing such a large diﬀerential is so
compelling.
Imagine a modiﬁcation of the Foot case of a choice between
giving a drug to a patient who needs it to save his life, or giving
the same drug to ﬁve patients each of whom could be saved
by one ﬁfth of it. Now the decision is between, say, devoting
resources to prevent the spreading a fatal disease, which would
otherwise aﬀect and kill a billion people, and devoting the very
same amount of resources to prolonging the life of one child.
This puzzle seems to have exactly the same structure as the Foot
case: giving resources to a billion people who could be saved
by one billionth part of it, and giving all these resources to one
person who needs it all to save her life. However, the superﬁcial
structural similarity is illusory. I want to suggest that the source
of our reaction to this second case does not lie in the weight of
numbers; it is, rather, a response to a fact that all theories of dis-
tributive justice must deal with, namely that principles of justice
operate in any human societies within the constraints of limited
resources available even to meet signiﬁcant needs. This, in and by
itself, means that there is a limit on the claims that a person can
have on others. There are restrictions, that is, on the reasonable
share each person can claim of scarce social resources available,
even to meet her vital needs.
Let us take stock. The defender of SGN highlights the
strength of consequentialist reasoning thus. We might accept
that there are counterintuitive consequences to pure aggregative
considerations when these lead to the lesser beneﬁts of many
people outweighing more urgent interests of a few. This imposes
some side constraints. But when there are similar harms facing
two groups of people, numbers ‘tip the balance’. If you are
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not moved when numbers are relatively small, just imagine the
possibility of saving a great number of people, and balance it
against saving just one person. I have resisted the analysis of
the ﬁrst case; and I deny that any intuitions in the second case
support SGN as applied to the ﬁrst case because the two cases
have a diﬀerent structure. Where our intuitions are moved when
numbers are inﬂated this is for a reason other than the mere
diﬀerence in numbers between the options.
To see this, return to one of our initial examples: the case of
the one in a hundred million teenager with a fatal disease. It is
a terrible thing for the teenager not to be cured and so to die
so young. Nevertheless, faced with such a dilemma, we do not
think that we are required to abandon resourcing education, the
arts and universities in order that he should survive. Why don’t
we ﬁnd this vital need here a compelling reason to act?
One possible explanation of our intuitions in this case is a
consequentialist thought, now played out in the social domain.
Namely, that the claims of need of an individual have to be
balanced against other kind of needs in society, and hence can be
outweighed by suﬃcient number of claims of other people.19 But
that is not the only explanation available, or the most intuitive
or plausible. An alternative way to think of these questions is
to envisage reasonable demands made of individuals, and their
reasonable objections to particular schemes of distribution. This
is to ask what constitutes not only a fair, but also a reasonable,
way of sharing resources. In asking this question we insist upon
considering individuals both within the perspective of making
claims, and within the perspective of having demands made upon
one. From this we can derive the idea of what I would call
a reasonable threshold beyond which I cannot make demands
on others, and they cannot make demands on me. This is not
necessarily something which we can determine by any algorithm,
but it is something we can recognize through the reciprocal
process of considering the two perspectives and the reasonable
resistance to or insistence on a given claim.
Given this way of looking at things, the reasonableness of the
demand depends both on how the various parties will be aﬀected,
19. For a detailed discussion of dilemmas involving conﬂicting claims of needs, see
Griﬃn, 1986.
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and on their share of common resources. To understand how we
make this kind of judgments, we need to draw a contrast between
an almost absolute evaluation of something as a misfortune, and
what reasonable claim one thereby has on others to prevent or
alleviate that misfortune. It is a dreadful misfortune to die at
ﬁfteen, well before the natural span of human life. However
the claim that the teenage victims of the extremely rare genetic
disease have on resources available to save lives is not a simple
function of the severity of their misfortune. The teenager has a
claim on common resources, as does any other individual in need
of help. At the same time, there is a threshold above which they
cease to have a claim: a threshold above which the share they
would claim of overall resources would become unreasonable,
for it would make unreasonable demands on others.
Now the idea of a threshold seems to invite a debate con-
cerning the exact point after which we are no longer required to
help others, even if they are in desperate need. In particular, the
idea of a reasonable threshold could be interpreted as a variant
of consequentialism with side constraints. (So the idea would be
to arrive at a general principle determining whether, and if so
at which level, others can hold back from making demands of
individuals. The problem thus understood would be to determine
systematically how to combine maximising considerations and
considerations of relative costs.) But so interpreting the idea
of a reasonable threshold would constitute a misunderstanding.
In the rest of this section, I want to sketch a little further the
contour of this idea, and to return to the comprehensiveness of
reasons.
Why would it be unreasonable for a teenager aﬀected by the
extremely rare illness I envisaged above to claim all the available
resources in his country? How are we to understand the limits
on the claims of needs that this person has on others? It seems
that in the circumstances others are not unfair in not throwing
all the resources available at him, that it would be selﬁsh for this
teenager to demand so much of others. But this thought has to
be interpreted carefully.
My talk of thresholds here should not be interpreted in
terms of a ﬁxed quantity derived from costs and beneﬁts across
society; nor more generally should we suppose that there is
some algorithm to which we can appeal which will determine
December 6, 2004 Time: 09:22am Veronique.tex
228 ve´ronique munoz-darde´
for us when a claim is above or below the threshold. It is true
that some may prefer to read this point in a consequentialist
manner; asking for a general principle which establishes a precise
level of cost at which it is reasonable for individuals to reject
demands of a certain kind made on them. My own suspicion
is that this is a vain and wrongheaded hope. A judgement is
required of what we can reasonably demand and withhold in
particular circumstances, and it doesn’t seem that ‘any plausible
theory could eliminate the need for judgments of this kind’
(Scanlon, 1998: 225). The idea is rather this: we recognize that
others have a claim on us, and we on others; but we also have
an understanding that in particular circumstances, with scarce
resources and a given pattern of claims, I do not occupy a
position from which it would be appropriate to demand more
from others. Exactly how these matters are to be determined
will vary from circumstance to circumstance as in all practical
matters.
The idea of a reasonable threshold thus deﬁnes an upper limit
to the share of overall resources that we think can reasonably
be demanded by any single individual. Because this threshold is
typically reached in cases which involve a choice between saving
either a very small or a very large number of people in need of
help, it might be tempting to think of it as being decided by the
weight of numbers; but this does not seem the best explanation.
While a consequentialist reading of this intuition would make
clear that numbers count, on our alternative reading, that is not
what matters, but rather the constraints imposed by the scarcity
of resources in the actual circumstances, and the reasonable
demands you can make on others.
By acknowledging these two limits (what we cannot
reasonably demand, what agents can reasonably withhold as
things stand), we are appropriately respecting persons (and
being respected by them). This is where the key contrast
with a seemingly similar line of thought, which leads to
consequentialism, is to be located. One of the key appeals of
consequentialist reasoning in social policy is the attractiveness
of not being selﬁsh in one’s demands on joint resources. But
if we take this thought to justify a maximizing conception of
distribution of welfare or resources, we have starkly counter-
intuitive consequences. For then the scope for the partiality
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of our concerns, which feeds into the justiﬁcation for the very
thought that it would be selﬁsh to demand so much of others, is
itself undermined.
In contrast, the idea of there being a reasonable threshold
beyond which I cannot make demands on others, and they
cannot make demands on me, leaves a space for such partial
concerns untouched. In other words: not all of an individual’s
ends are up for consideration, not everything can be calculated
in terms of utility or disutility, without losing sight of the very
reason why we began distributing in the ﬁrst place. This, I
suggest, is the way to understand the limits on claims of needs
in the example of the teenager and the extremely rare illness.
We now see in the social sphere an echo of the thought we
already raised in relation to individual moral action, namely
that we should not suppose that the principles of right action
provide comprehensive reasons which determine the rightness or
wrongness of all ways of acting. Rather, they provide a frame-
work within which there can be distinct, and even conﬂicting,
intelligible reasons which can move agents in one direction or
another. And now at the social level, we see a need for principles
of distribution which can negotiate the reasonable demands we
can make on each other, given the scarcity of resources, while
allowing for each to pursue their own particular projects.
VIII
The introduction of the idea of a reasonable threshold might
appear unsatisfactory, for at least two reasons. The ﬁrst of these
is the diﬃculty of determining whether, and if so at which exact
point, we reach such a threshold. We saw that this objection
originates from a misunderstanding of the idea. But now I want
to consider a second objection, more germane to the case under
discussion.
The objection I have in mind concerns the diﬃculty of
explaining what, for lack of a better word, I will call
‘intermediate’ cases. Let me explain. Thus far we considered the
case of an agent faced with a dilemma between saving two people
and saving one (when he cannot save all three). We saw that all
three people have a claim to be saved, and that it is permissible
for the agent to save either side. As for the decision to save
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either one or a billion, I suggest that there is a threshold after
which we cease to have a claim on others. But neither of these
two diagnoses is available if we move to a third type of choice.
Consider the following case.
A landslide occurs, trapping people in a mine. They are trapped
in two separate caves. In one of them, there is one person. In
the second, there are a hundred. Experts reckon that there will
shortly be a second landslide, which will make it quite impossible
to rescue any of the people involved. They advise that there is
just about enough time to rescue either the one or the hundred,
but deﬁnitely not to rescue people in both caves.
Here too, it seems irresponsible for rescuers to decide to save
the person isolated in her cave, rather than the hundred. Is this
conclusion reached because of the weight of numbers? That may
be one reading of it. But there are reasons to think that it is not
as simple as that. Say that the landslide had occurred slightly
diﬀerently, and there were forty one people in the ﬁrst cave and
sixty in the second, rescuers might concentrate hard on other
salient aspects, such as the respective accessibility of both caves.
Indeed, in justifying their decision to the victims, it is much more
natural for the rescuers to use this reason (accessibility), rather
than saying: ‘Unfortunately, you are only forty one, and they
are sixty.’
It would be hasty therefore in this example as in the others to
assume that it is best explained by SGN. But how else might we
explain it? Given the urgency, the diﬃculty and the uncertainties
of the rescue, it is diﬃcult for us not to be moved by the thought
that the rescue may fail. The caves may collapse before there is
a chance to save anyone. Or there may be enough time to save
some, but not all of the hundred people trapped in the second
cave. So in the circumstances, we think of the case as involving a
choice between possibly meeting no claim, and meeting at least
some claim. As a result, what are maximized are our chances to
meet some claim rather than none. So we think that we should
direct eﬀorts towards the cave with a hundred people, in the hope
to save at least some.
Indeed, just such an intelligible reason is what may move us
not to save the greater number in cases considered earlier, cases
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of one versus ﬁve. Suppose you are in a boat facing a choice
between rescuing ﬁve people stranded on a rock, and one person
stranded on another, and that the water is raising quickly, so you
do not have enough time to save them all. You are not certain
that your boat will be able to rescue the ﬁve without eventually
sinking under the excess of weight in the middle of the ocean.
Your worry is that you may end up saving no one, therefore
wasting your capacity to help. So you go and rescue the single
person.
What this shows is that it is very diﬃcult to maintain pure
intuitions about cases in which everything is symmetrical apart
from the numbers involved. What the intermediate cases have
in common with the examples from social policy is that it is
doubtful that we can screen oﬀ our reactions to the descriptions
from our background assumptions about the actual resources
likely to be available in the circumstances, and other features
of the situation which are liable to introduce considerations
which can tip the balance in one direction rather than the
other, without numbers themselves directly contributing to the
decision one makes. The only real test for the signiﬁcance of
numbers per se is precisely to employ the pure (and artiﬁcial)
examples we considered in the ﬁrst half of the paper. But,
as we saw, in those cases it is just not obvious that there
is a principle of SGN. And as we have seen, nothing about
these further cases shows a distinctive role for such a principle
either.
IX
To conclude: in this paper, I have set out to throw doubt on
the idea that our principles of social policy are in fact directly
sensitive to numbers of people involved. There are cases in which
we have a duty to help what is, in fact, the greater number, but
this is not so because they are more numerous. Numbers seem to
be salient in such cases only because we have a way of describing
them in short hand, where the reasons which really move us are
concerns related, but not identical, to the ratios of the people
involved.
I have oﬀered evidence for this conclusion by moving back
and forth between the individual perspective and that of social
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policy. We might hope that a pure case in which nothing else but
numbers is salient would establish the basis for a social principle.
However, although the pure case of an agent facing a choice
between saving one and saving two people allows us to isolate
numbers, when we do that it doesn’t seem that a demonstration
of a duty to save the greater number is possible. No one is
wronged by saving either.
In the second half of this paper, I have considered cases
in which numbers really do seem to have an impact on our
decisions at the level of social policy. Many have been tempted
to suppose that the duty which would be discovered in the
more abstract cases explains our intuitions in the realm of
distributive justice. That is not my diagnosis. I have argued
that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two kinds of
case—namely that cases in the social sphere impinge on the
question of the scarcity of common resources, and consequently
the reasonable threshold on one’s claims of need.20 Now, this
thought too can be interpreted in a consequentialist way—
one may think that the only way to address a competition
of needs is to aggregate them. Over the last few pages, I
began to sketch an alternative way of thinking about reconciling
individual need and common scarcity. Particularly in the context
of formulating social policy, we need to ﬁnd a perspective which
pays proper attention both to individuals’ partial concerns and
to their willingness to join together in non-selﬁsh schemes of
co-operation.
Department of Philosophy,
University College London
Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT
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20. The urgency and severity of claims of need in the social case sometimes
overshadow how we think of the individual agent having to decide whom to give
vital aid to. Thus some ﬁnd it tempting to think of the aid given by the individual
agent, too, as a scarce resource. This is a mistake. There may be several other people
equipped to give aid. Each of them has the same duty to help for as long as help
is needed and/or someone else has discharged this duty. None of them is a scarce,
common, resource.
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